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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal as it 
relates to the King defendants because of plaintiff's defective 
notice of appeal. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal with respect to the King defendants as a result of 
plaintiff's defective notice of appeal. 
(2) Whether plaintiff, despite the requirements of Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, can dispute factual issues for 
the first time on appeal and raise facts not contained in the 
record on appeal. 
(3) Whether the King defendants are entitled to judgment 
as a result of plaintiff's failure to make a factual showing to 
establish the elements of her claim for legal malpractice in the 
face of defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
(4) Whether the King defendants are entitled to judgment 
based upon the admitted facts. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff Helen S. Coleman ("plaintiff") commenced 
this legal malpractice action against defendants in April of 
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1988. Pursuant to a stipulation of counsel, the district court 
dismissed defendant Glen T. Cella from the case with prejudice. 
(R. at p. 54). In November of 1988, defendants filed motions 
for summary judgment. (R. at pp. 74 and 145). Shortly 
thereafter, plaintiff's counsel withdrew and plaintiff began 
representing herself. Because of the withdrawal of plaintiff's 
counsel, the district court postponed hearing defendants' motions 
until late January of 1989. (R. at p. 155). On January 24, 1989, 
the district court heard argument from plaintiff and counsel for 
defendants, and then took the motions under advisement. 
(Reporter's Transcript of January 24, 1989 Hearing Motion for 
Summary Judgment). On March 1, 1989, the Honorable Rodney S. Page 
issued a ruling granting defendants' motions and directing 
defendants to prepare findings and orders. (R. at p. 165). On 
April 3, 1989, the district court approved findings of fact and 
entered judgment in favor of the Florence defendants. (R. at 
pp. 185 and 198). On April 18, 1989, the district court approved 
1This action was initially filed by Oscar Howard Coleman and 
Helen S. Coleman. Plaintiff Oscar S. Coleman dismissed his claims 
against defendants. (R. at p. 161). However, many of the actions 
of plaintiff in this case were undertaken with Mr. Coleman, and 
for ease of reference, in those situations, reference is made to 
plaintiffs. 
2
"Defendants" shall refer to all defendants in this case. 
In some instances, a distinction is required between the 
defendants. When a distinction is required, defendants Felshaw 
King and King & King shall be referred to as the "King defendants" 
and defendants Brian R. Florence, John Blair Hutchison and 
Florence & Hutchison shall be referred to as the "Florence 
defendants." 
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findings of fact and entered judgment in favor of the King 
defendants. (R. at pp. 202 and 211). On April 28, 1989, 
plaintiff filed her Amended Notice of Appeal, in which she 
appealed the "judgment of the Honorable Rodney S. Page entered on 
the 3rd day of April, A.D., 1989-M (R. at p. 213). On June 12, 
1989, the King defendants moved to dismiss the appeal as to them 
based on plaintiff's failure to appeal the order entered by the 
district court on April 18, 1989. That same day, the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS.3 
On March 8, 1979, plaintiffs sold the property located at 
354 East 200 South, Clearfield, Utah to Doyle and Goldie Logan 
(the "Logans") for a total sum of $105,000.00 pursuant to a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract ("Real Estate Contract"). Plaintiffs 
received $25,084.65 as a down payment on the purchase. On 
August 1, 1979, the Logans sold their interest in the property to 
Wayne and Kim Carlos pursuant to an Assignment of Escrow. Wayne 
and Kim Carlos assumed the $83,642.58 balance due on principal, 
plus 11.5 percent interest, at $1,072.23 per month. On June 8, 
1983, Wayne and Kim Carlos were divorced and Kim Carlos was 
awarded the property. Plaintiffs were fully apprised and aware of 
^The facts are all taken from the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; R. at pp. 
77-85. 
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the property purchase by Wayne and Kim Carlos, and of the 
subsequent divorce and distribution of the property to Kim Carlos. 
In March of 1984, due to a history of late payments dating 
from August 1979 to March 1984, plaintiffs reached an agreement 
with Kim Carlos which modified the Real Estate Contract and 
Assignment of Escrow. The agreement extended the maturity of the 
debt, increased the interest rate from 11.5 percent per annum to 20 
percent per annum, increased the monthly installment payments from 
$1,072.23 to $1,435.00, and added late fees on all delinquent 
payments of $71.00 prior to the 15th of each month and $142.00 
subsequent to the 15th of each month. The terms of the agreement 
between the plaintiffs and Kim Carlos, along with a blank real 
estate form, were given to a secretary at King & King by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff asked a secretary at King & King to prepare a 
modification agreement by typing the terms of the agreement on the 
blank form. Pursuant to plaintiff's request, a modification 
agreement was drafted by Glen Cella under the supervision of 
defendant, Felshaw King. The final draft of the Modification 
Agreement did not include the Logans or Wayne Carlos as parties, 
and specifically states that Kim Carlos was the only party to the 
modifications, and was the only party responsible and liable for 
further payments. The Modification Agreement was signed by 
plaintiffs and Kim Carlos on March 29, 1984. 
From March 29, 1984 until June 1, 1986, the date when Kim 
Carlos defaulted, plaintiffs received payments from Kim Carlos 
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under the terms of the Modification Agreement. Plaintiffs never 
contacted Wayne Carlos or the Logans regarding any delinquent 
payments under the contract and never made any demand that Wayne 
Carlos or the Logans make any additional payments for the property. 
On July 10, 1986, plaintiff contacted defendant, Brian R. 
Florence, for legal assistance with the default of Kim Carlos. A 
Verified Complaint for foreclosure was prepared and verified by 
plaintiffs on August 8, 1986. In the Verified Complaint, plaintiff 
stated under oath that they agreed to substitute Kim Carlos as the 
sole buyer of the property. In the foreclosure action, on 
March 11, 1987, Judge Page entered judgment for plaintiffs against 
Kim Carlos for $60,497.35 in principal, interest and late fees; 
which included $12,672.67 for the first and second mortgage, 
$3,792.11 in delinquent property taxes, $1,664.00 for plaintiffs' 
attorneys' fees, $390.00 for attorneys1 fees for First Security 
Bank and $300.00 for attorneys1 fees for Bank of Utah. 
On May 12, 1987, after prior discussions with plaintiffs, 
Brian R. Florence bid $67,975.61, which included the sum total of 
judgment plus interest, for the property at foreclosure. This 
amount was bid despite plaintiffs' continual representation to 
defendant Brian R. Florence, that the property in question was 
worth at least $105,000.00, the amount it was sold for in 1979. 
Plaintiff was present at the foreclosure sale and did not object to 
the bid that was offered by defendant, Brian R. Florence. 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Appeal fails to indicate 
that plaintiff is appealing the judgment entered in favor of the 
King defendants on April 18, 1989. The Amended Notice of Appeal 
indicates that plaintiff is appealing the judgment entered on 
April 3, 1989. As a result of the defective notice, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to review the judgment entered in favor of the 
King defendants. 
Defendants properly filed motions for summary judgment 
supported by legal memoranda that recited the factual basis for the 
motions. The motions complied with the requirements of Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration. Plaintiff failed to file or present 
any evidence contradicting the facts set forth in the memoranda 
supporting defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff 
cannot now ask this Court to reverse the district court based on 
factual disputes not raised below or on facts that are not 
contained in the record on appeal. 
Based upon the admitted facts, the district court 
correctly granted judgment in favor of the King defendants. 
Plaintiff claims the King defendants were negligent by relieving 
the Logans and Wayne Carlos from liability under the Modification 
Agreement. However, by failing to oppose defendants' motions for 
summary judgment, plaintiff failed to produce any expert testimony 
as to the standard of care owed by the King defendants to plaintiff 
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in connection with drafting the Modification Agreement. 
Plaintiff's failure in this regard is sufficient reason for entry 
of judgment under Rule 56 and the cases interpreting Rule 56. 
Even if plaintiff had submitted the required expert 
testimony, the admitted facts show that plaintiff intended that Kim 
Carlos be the sole person responsible for payments under the 
Modification Agreement, and therefore, the district court properly 
concluded that the King defendants were entitled to judgment. In 
addition, plaintiff offered no evidence to show that the King 
defendants' alleged negligence was the proximate cause of any 
damage. The admitted facts show that even if the King defendants 
were nggligent in failing to include the Logans and Wayne Carlos as 
responsible parties after the Modification Agreement, that 
negligence was not the proximate cause of any damage to plaintiff. 
For these reasons, the district court correctly entered judgment 
for the King defendants, and this Court should affirm the judgment 
on appeal. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
ORDER GRANTING THE KING DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
OF PLAINTIFF'S DEFECTIVE AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
Rule 3(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court requires 
that a notice of appeal designate the judgment or order appealed 
from. Without a proper notice of appeal, the Court is without 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 
(Utah 1981). In Yost, a multiple defendant case, the Utah Supreme 
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Court refused to take jurisdiction of an appeal from a summary 
judgment granted in favor of one co-defendant in connection with 
an appeal of other portions of the case because the appeal of the 
summary judgment was never perfected. Ld. at 1047. 
This Court also lacks jurisdiction over an untimely 
appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d, 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982); 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982); and Nelson 
v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, plaintiff's Amended Notice of Appeal does 
not designate the judgment entered in favor of the King defendants 
on April 18, 1989, and the time for taking such an appeal has 
run. Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal against the King defendants 
should be dismissed. 
B. PLAINTIFF CANNOT DISPUTE THE FACTS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration set forth in 
detail the procedure to be followed by a party who seeks to 
contradict evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment. 
When the procedure is not followed, the statement of facts of the 
party moving for summary judgment shall be "deemed admitted", and 
summary judgment, if appropriate shall be granted. Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(5); Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56(e). The deemed admission exists not only for 
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the district court, but also, through all reviews of the district 
court's actions by appellate courts. In Busch Corporation v. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing an appeal from a summary 
judgment, held that when an argument is not raised before the 
district court, it cannot be raised on appeal. Id. at 1219. 
Quoting from an earlier opinion, the Court stated: 
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment and fails to file any 
responsive affidavits or other evidentiary 
materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court 
may properly conclude that there are no genuine 
issues of fact unless the face of the movant's 
affidavit affirmatively discloses the existence 
of such an issue. Without such a showing, the 
Court need only decide whether, on the basis of 
the applicable law, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment. 
Id. (citing Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983)); see also Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, the record on appeal clearly shows that 
plaintiff failed to file an opposition to defendants' motions and 
made no attempt whatsoever to contradict the facts submitted by 
defendants in support of their motions. Under these 
circumstances, defendants' stated facts are "deemed admitted", and 
the district court and this Court are bound by the admitted 
facts. Accordingly, plaintiff's argument against the district 
court's findings of fact at pp. 12-30 of Appellant's Opening Brief 
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must be disregarded as they are not established from the record on 
appeal and are being raised for the first time on appeal. 
C. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED 
TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THE ELEMENTS OF HER LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIM. 
Although the facts deemed admitted must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987), this Court must affirm the 
district court's judgment because plaintiff failed to make any 
factual showing establishing the essential elements of her claim. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for 
summary judgment. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
(1986), the United States Supreme Court made the following 
statement regarding the comparable Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment 
after adequate time for discovery and upon 
motion, against a party who fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an essential element to that party's case, and on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no 
genuine issue as to any material fact,1 since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential 
element of the non-moving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 
The moving party is 'entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law' because the non-moving party has 
failed to make a sufficient showing of her case 
with respect to which she has the burden of proof. 
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Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added). See Robinson v. Intermountain 
Health, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987). In other words, to 
avoid judgment, plaintiff was required to raise factual issues 
sufficient to establish the existence of all the elements 
necessary to recover on her claim for legal malpractice. 
In order to establish a case of legal malpractice, 
plaintiff must prove each and every one of the following elements: 
1. an attorney/client relationship; 
2. a duty of the attorney to the client; 
3. a breach of the duty; 
4. damages suffered by the client; and 
5. that the attorneys' negligence 
proximately caused the damage to the client. 
Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988). 
1. Plaintiff Failed to Establish that the King Defendants 
Breached Their Duty to Plaintiff. 
In order to establish breach of duty, a plaintiff in a 
legal malpractice case, like a plaintiff in a medical malpractice 
case, must introduce expert testimony concerning the standard of 
care. Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982) 
("[a]bsent a situation where the propriety of the treatment 
received is within the common knowledge and experience of the 
layman, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must prove the 
standard of care by expert medical testimony.") See also, Martin 
v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 (Utah App. 1987) (Court affirmed summary 
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judgment in favor of medical malpractice defendants when plaintiff 
failed to produce competent expert testimony to show standard of 
care and breach of that standard by defendants.) In one of the 
leading treatises on legal malpractice, the need for expert 
testimony is explained as follows: 
Whether an attorney has complied with the 
standard of care is an issue of fact, unless the 
evidence is so patent and conclusive that 
reasonable persons can reach only one conclusion. 
Thus, expert testimony is necessary to establish 
the standard of care since only an attorney can 
competently testify to whether the defendant 
comported to the prevailing legal standard. 
Without expert assistance, lay juries cannot 
understand litigation issues, local practices, or 
the broad spectrum of issues which influence how 
an attorney should act or advise. 
R. Mallen and J. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989) § 27.15, 
pp. 667-68, and cases cited therein. 
In this case, plaintiff claims that the King defendants 
were negligent in drafting the Modification Agreement. To 
determine whether plaintiff's claim has any validity, plaintiff 
would have to establish the standard of care owed to plaintiff by 
the King defendants and that the King defendants breached that 
duty. The duty of care owed to a person in plaintiff's position 
is not something that is within the common knowledge of the 
layperson and can only be established by expert testimony. 
Whether the Modification Agreement drafted by the King defendants 
meets the standard of care is also an issue beyond the common 
knowledge of the layperson. In this case, plaintiff failed to 
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present any expert testimony in opposition to defendants' motions 
for summary judgment concerning the standard of care or concerning 
breach of that standard, and by failing to do so, plaintiff failed 
to establish an essential element of her case. 
2. Plaintiff Failed to Produce Any Evidence Shoving that the 
King Defendants' Alleged Negligence Was the Proximate 
Cause of Any Damages Suffered by Plaintiff. 
Proximate cause in legal malpractice actions embodies the 
concept of a case within a case. As the Utah Supreme Court noted 
in Williams v. Barber, "incurring liability through a breach of 
duty does not necessarily result in damages." 765 P.2d at 889. 
This is because in a legal malpractice action, "proximate cause 
embraces an assessment of the merits of the underlying cause of 
action." IcL; see also Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 
584 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1978) (appropriate to inquire as to what 
the plaintiff's position would have been if attorney had performed 
the act properly); Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 
1968) (in order to make out a cause of action against an attorney 
for failing to advise plaintiff of right to appeal, it would have 
to be shown that there was a reasonable likelihood of reversing 
the judgment and that it would have benefited plaintiff). In 
other words, before a court can determine that a plaintiff has 
been damaged, there must be some evidence as to what the 
plaintiff's position would have been had the attorney performed 
properly. 
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In this case, for plaintiff to establish the element of 
proximate cause, she was required to produce some evidence showing 
that the omission of the Logans and Wayne Carlos from continuing 
liability after the Modification Agreement caused plaintiff 
damage. Plaintiff has produced no evidence in this regard. There 
is no evidence to show that had the Logans and Wayne Carlos been 
liable for payments after the Modification Agreement that 
additional payments would have been made. There is no evidence to 
show that had the Logans and Wayne Carlos been liable that 
plaintiff would have received more than she did through the 
foreclosure action. Without evidence of this type, plaintiff 
cannot raise any factual issues as to the proximate cause element 
of her legal malpractice claim, and judgment in favor of the King 
defendants must be affirmed. 
D. THE KING DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT BASED ON THE 
ADMITTED FACTS. 
1. The Admitted Facts Show that Plaintiff Intended Only 
Kim Carlos to be Responsible and Liable for Payments 
After the Modification Agreement. 
Not only did plaintiff fail to counter defendants' 
motions for summary judgment with the required expert testimony, 
but the admitted facts show that plaintiff cannot establish that 
their was a breach of the duty by the King defendants. In this 
case, plaintiff claims that the King defendants were negligent in 
omitting the Logans and Wayne Carlos from liability after the 
Modification Agreement. The admitted facts show that plaintiff 
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intended that Kim Carlos be the only person with continuing 
responsibility and liability for payments when plaintiff signed 
the Modification Agreement. The final draft of the Modification 
Agreement was signed by plaintiff and Kim Carlos in March of 
1989. The definitions in the Modification Agreement clearly 
identify only Kim M. Carlos as the "Buyer." The language of the 
Modification Agreement clearly indicates that the Logans and Wayne 
Carlos were not liable for future payments, and that Kim Carlos 
alone would be responsible and liable for all future payments. 
Plaintiff once again evidenced this intent by signing the 
Verified Complaint in the foreclosure action that stated: 
5. That on March 29, 1984, the plaintiffs 
entered into a modification of the original Real 
Estate Contract wherein they agreed to substitute 
Kim Carlos as the sole buyer of the premises and 
eliminate any further obligation or 
responsibility of the Logans, and further 
modified the terms of the payments that would be 
made by the defendant Kim Carlos in the future. 
6. That by the terms of the modification 
agreement, Kim Carlos was to make monthly 
payments of $1,435.00 beginning with the first 
day of April, 1984, said payments to be received 
on or before the 10th day of each month, after 
which late charges would be assessed. 
7. That the documents of title were being 
held in escrow and all payments were to be paid 
through escrow. 
8. That the defendant Kim Carlos has 
repeatedly been delinquent in her monthly 
payments and repeated demand letters have been 
made to the escrow agent. 
9. That the defendant Kim Carlos failed to 
make the June, 1986 payment and after the 
appropriate demand letter was submitted to her, 
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all documents of title have been returned to the 
plaintiffs. 
10. That the defendant Kim Carlos has also 
failed to pay the real property taxes as required 
by the Real Estate Contract for the 1983, 1984 
and 1985 calendar years. 
(R. at pp. 116-17). The Verified Complaint contains no allegations 
that the Logans or Wayne Carlos were in default and liable for 
payments. Based on this evidence, it is proper to conclude that 
plaintiff failed to create a factual issue concerning breach of 
the standard of care by the King defendants, and thus affirm the 
district court's entry of judgment in favor of the King defendants. 
2. The Admitted Facts Show that the King Defendants' Alleged 
Negligence Was Not the Proximate Cause of Damage to 
Plaintiff. 
The admitted facts show that at the time of the 
foreclosure sale, plaintiff was owed $60,497.35 as a result of Kim 
Carlos' breach of the Modification Agreement. The admitted facts 
also show that at the foreclosure sale, plaintiff bid $67,975.61, 
which sum included the total judgment plus interest. Under Utah 
law, plaintiff was not entitled to recover any amount from Kim 
Carlos in excess of the judgment amount. By bidding a sum equal 
to or greater than the judgment amount at the foreclosure sale, 
plaintiff was not entitled to seek any amount as a deficiency from 
Kim Carlos. Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-32. This would have also been 
true as to the Logans and Wayne Carlos if they had also been 
liable for payments after the Modification Agreement. 
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Accordingly, because the omission of the Logans and Wayne Carlos 
from liability after the Modification Agreement was not the 
proximate cause of any damage to plaintiff, judgment in favor of 
the King defendants must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the 
judgment entered in favor of the King defendants because 
plaintiffs Amended Notice of Appeal does not appeal that judgment. 
Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence in opposition to 
defendants* motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs failure to 
do so prevents her from seeking to create factual issues for the 
first time on appeal. By failing to oppose defendants' motions 
for summary judgment, plaintiff failed to produce evidence 
sufficient to make a showing as to the essential elements of her 
claim for legal malpractice. Plaintiffs failure to make such a 
showing entitles defendants to judgment. In addition, the 
admitted facts establish that the King defendants are entitled to 
judgment. Accordingly, this Court should affirm judgment of the 
district court entered in favor of the King defendants. 
DATED this 3 / S"f~~ day of August, 1989. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Thomas L. KayC/ 
Paul D. Newman 
Attorneys for Defendants 
9095n 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3/sfday of August, 1989, 
four (4) true and correct copies of BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS FELSHAW 
KING AND KING & KING were mailed by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Carman E, Kipp 
Shawn McGarry 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre 1, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Attorneys for Brian R. Florence, 
Florence & Hutchison and 
John Blair Hutchison 
Helen Coleman 
261 Marilyn Drive 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
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